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INTRODUCTION
In response to the rapid literary growth during the 1800’s,
the Swiss Government invited various countries to meet in
Berne, Switzerland, in an attempt to establish international
copyright unification.1 These meetings spawned the Berne
Convention of 1886 (the “Convention”), which served as an
international agreement to protect literary and artistic property.2
Its most recent revision in 1971 extended the convention’s
protection to “authors of works of architecture erected in a
country of the Union or of other artistic works incorporated in a
building or other structure located in a country of the Union.”3
For over a century, the United States refused to accede to
the Convention due to philosophical differences between the U.S.
copyright system and the system enacted by the Convention.4
The United States was mainly concerned that the Convention
violated the Constitution, which expressed that enactment of
copyright law should be meant for the benefit of the public.5 As
the United States experienced rapid technological growth, U.S.
copyright law evolved, making it easier for the United States to
come into compliance with the Convention.6 The United States
ultimately acceded to the Convention in 1988.7
†
Senior Staff, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., cum laude, 2016, St. John’s
University School of Law; B.A., 2012, Chemistry, Hofstra University.
1
Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the
Future, 3 J.L. & TECH. 1, 12–13 (1988).
2
Id. at 1.
3
Id. at 41.
4
Id. at 67–68.
5
Id. at 68 n.462.
6
Id. at 67–68.
7
Id. at 67.
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The United States’s compliance with the Berne Convention
has left United States Federal Courts with the troubling issue of
how much protection architectural works should be afforded.8 If
the copyright protection is too narrow, the law may create an
insufficient incentive for architects to invest in creating
innovative designs due to lack of protection from infringement.9
Conversely, if copyright protection is too broad, the result may
allow architects to possess too broad a monopoly over certain
innovative designs.10
The issue has led to a recent ruling by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which created a circuit
split with the Eleventh Circuit.11 The Eleventh Circuit has
concluded that architectural works are only subject to thin
copyright protection,12 whereas the Second Circuit has concluded
that architectural works should receive full protection under
copyright law.13
Part I of this Note discusses the history of copyright
legislation in the United States regarding architectural works, as
well the applicability of copyright law generally.
Part II
discusses the circuit split between the Eleventh and Second
Circuits with regard to how much protection architectural works
should be afforded.
Part III analyzes the benefits and
shortcomings of both approaches and how other courts should
ultimately adopt the Second Circuit’s approach. This Note
argues that the Second Circuit’s approach is supported not only
by statutory language and legislative history, but also by public
policy and constitutional considerations, as well.

8
See Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2014);
Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 914, 919 (11th
Cir. 2008).
9
Stephen D. Milbrath, The 11th Circuit's New Copyright Standard for
Architectural Works, 83 NOV FLA. B.J. 49, 50–51 (2009).
10
Id. at 51.
11
Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 103–04.
12
Intervest Constr., Inc., 554 F.3d at 919.
13
Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 103–04; see Rolwes Co. v. Barnes, No. 4:14CV1045,
2014 WL 3701039, at *3 (E.D. Mo. July 25, 2014) amended by No. 4:14CV1045, 2014
WL 4966071 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2014).
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BACKGROUND

History of Copyright Legislation

Under the Copyright Act of 1976, architectural plans fell
within the definition of “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
work[s],”14 which included two and three-dimensional designs but
did not extend protection to works that were considered “useful
articles.”15 The Act defined a “useful article” as an “article
having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to
portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”16
Courts have reasoned that “if design elements reflect a merger of
aesthetic and functional considerations, the artistic aspects of a
work cannot be said to be conceptually separable from the
utilitarian elements.”17 As a result, architectural works received
very limited protection under the Act.18 This is due to the fact
that architectural works are almost always constructed with
functional utility in mind as the basis for the structure.
In response to joining the Berne Convention, Congress
passed the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of
1990.19 The purpose of the Act was to create “a new category of
protect[a]ble subject matter for architectural works.”20
17 U.S.C. § 101 now defines architectural works as “the design of
a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression,
including a building, architectural plans, or drawings. The work
includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and
composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does not
include individual standard features.”21

14
ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 500 (Vicki Been et. al. eds., 6th ed. 2012).
15
Id. at 482. The legislative history explains that the definition of “pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works” was intended by the Committee to “draw as clear a
line as possible between copyrightable works of applied art and uncopyrighted works
of industrial design.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 54–55 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667–68;see MERGES ET AL., supra note 14, at 483.
16
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668.
17
Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir.
1987).
18
MERGES ET AL., supra note 14.
19
Id.
20
Vanessa N. Scaglione, Building Upon the Architectural Works Protection
Copyright Act of 1990, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 193, 193 (1992).
21
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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Copyright Law Generally

Over the years, courts have implemented various doctrines
to determine whether one’s work is copyrightable. Traditionally,
copyright law has been meant to “promote the [p]rogress of
[s]cience and useful [a]rts” by awarding protection to original
works of original expression.22 Perhaps the most significant
doctrine that limits the copyrightability of works is the ideaexpression dichotomy. Under Title 17, full copyright protection is
given to original works of authorship, but the protection does not
extend to “any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form
in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in
such work.”23 While one’s original expression is protected under
copyright law, the ideas relating to such expression are not.24
Another such application that a court will use is the merger
doctrine.25 The doctrine establishes that “when there is only one
or but a few ways of expressing an idea, then courts will find that
the idea behind the work merges with its expression and the
work is not copyrightable.”26 Courts will also look to see if the
22

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2012). See Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky, Skelly, Eng’rs
LLP, 303 F.3d 460, 469 (2d Cir. 2002). The court in Sparaco applied the ideaexpression dichotomy and held that an architectural plan for a building did not
consist only of general ideas, but included “specific expression and realization of
those ideas.” Id. The court went on to explain that there is no “simple bright-line
test” to determine at what point an abstract idea becomes one’s original expression.
Id. As a result, the court must examine the issue on a case-by-case basis. Id.
24
MERGES ET AL., supra note 14, at 481; see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102
(1879); Sparaco, 303 F.3d at 469. In Baker, the author of a book, which outlined the
art of book-keeping, brought suit for copyright infringement against a defendant
who had instituted the book’s teachings into their own book-keeping. 101 U.S. at
100. The court found that there was no infringement, holding that while “no one has
a right to print or publish his book, or any material part thereof, as a book intended
to convey instruction in the art, any person may practise and use the art itself which
he has described and illustrated therein.” Id. at 104.
25
See MERGES ET AL., supra note 14, at 481; see generally Morrissey v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967). In Morrissey, the court was asked to
examine the plaintiff’s copyright of a set of rules, which were used for a sales
promotional “sweepstakes” that involved the participant disclosing their social
security number. Id. at 676. The court found that the rules could not be protected
under copyright law based on the merger doctrine. Id. at 678. The court reasoned
that “[w]hen the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that ‘the topic
necessarily requires’ . . . if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited
number, [permitting a copyright] . . . “could exhaust all possibilities of future use of
the substance.” Id. (citations omitted).
26
MERGES ET AL., supra note 14, at 481 (emphasis omitted).
23
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work in question is in the “public domain.”27 While copyright law
protects “original works of authorship,” it does not protect other
aspects of the work that are in the public domain and “free for
others to draw upon.”28 Such aspects include “the history [the
work] describes, the facts it mentions, and the ideas it
embraces.”29
Finally, courts will apply the “scènes-à-faire”
The doctrine states that elements, which are
doctrine.30
“standard” or “indispensable” with regard to a given topic, fall
outside the scope of copyright protection.31 For example, cowboys
and bank robbers in an American western film are standard
elements and therefore receive no protection.32
Generally, when bringing a claim for copyright infringement,
one must prove two main elements.33 The plaintiff must prove
(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) “copying of constituent
elements of the work that are original.”34 At issue with regard to
copyright infringement of architectural works is, what
constitutes “too much copying,” and what aspects of the work are
considered the architect’s original expression.35 Not all copying is
automatically considered infringement because not all aspects of
a copyrighted work are protected under copyright law.36
A copyrighted work may consist of both original
copyrightable elements and uncopyrightable, unoriginal
elements. Any copying of the unprotected elements will not be
considered infringement.37 The similarity between works may
derive only from unprotected elements, so when examining
whether the works are “substantially similar,” the court must
confine itself to the similarities that exist with regard to the
protected elements of the works.38 To determine if the works are
substantially similar, courts employ the “ordinary observer

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
Id.
Id. at 345.
Id.
Id. at 348.
Id.
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test.”39 Under the test, the two works are substantially similar if
“the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities,
would be disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic
appeal as the same.”40 When applying the ordinary observer test,
courts have established that the work should be examined as a
whole, rather than focus solely on the differences between the
works.41
When determining whether there is copyright infringement,
it is essential to identify what type of work is allegedly being
copied since different types of works receive different levels of
protection. In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co. Inc., the United States Supreme Court established that
compiled works should receive only “thin” copyright protection.42
Thin protection has traditionally protected only against verbatim
reproduction of the original work.43 The protection is limited due
to the fact that the range of possible expression is narrow.44
Under Title 17, compiled works or compilations are defined as
“work[s] formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in
such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an
original work of authorship.”45 Title 17 further requires that the
compiled work be original in order to receive any protection
under copyright law.46
39
Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001); Knitwaves, Inc. v.
Lollytogs Ltd. Inc., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v.
Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). It is worth noting that “[t]he
copying need not be of every detail so long as the copy is substantially similar to the
copyrighted work.” Comptone Co., Ltd. v. Rayex Corp., 251 F.2d 487, 488 (2d Cir.
1958).
40
Boisson, 273 F.3d at 272; Knitwaves, Inc., 71 F.3d at 1002. Whether an
ordinary observer would find the two works to be substantially similar is a question
of fact best left for the jury to decide. See Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d
904, 914 (9th Cir. 2010). The jury must determine if an “ordinary, reasonable
observer viewing the works in their totality would perceive the allegedly infringing
work to be substantially similar to the copyrightable portions of the plaintiff's work.”
1 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW § 4:15,
ELEMENTS OF AN INFRINGEMENT CLAIM; “SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY” TEST (2015).
41
Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109–10 (9th Cir.
1970).
42
499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
43
See Sun Media Sys., Inc. v. KDSM, LLC, 564 F. Supp. 2d 946, 978 (S.D. Iowa
2008); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994).
44
Apple Computer, Inc., 35 F.3d at 1446.
45
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
46
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
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In Feist Publications Inc., a telephone utility company
brought a copyright infringement suit against the publisher of a
telephone directory for using the utility company’s local white
page listings.47 Plaintiff had taken the telephone listings from
the defendant’s local telephone book and included those listings
in their area-wide telephone directory.48 The listings were a list
of names in alphabetical order along with each person’s
respective telephone number.49 The court ultimately held that
the alphabetical listing of names with corresponding telephone
numbers received no protection under copyright law because the
listings “lack[ed] the modicum of creativity necessary to
transform mere selection into copyrightable expression.”50
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT
Should architectural works also be considered compilations?
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
answers that question in the affirmative, finding that
architectural works should only receive thin protection because
they resemble compilations. The Second Circuit, on the other
hand, disagrees, explaining that architectural works are an art
form and should be afforded full protection under copyright law.
A.

The Eleventh Circuit’s Thin Protection Approach

In Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., the Eleventh
Circuit attempted to develop a procedure for properly analyzing
when an architectural work has been infringed.51 There, the
plaintiff had developed a design for a high-rise building, which
incorporated alternating concave and convex segments and
elevator cores, which protrude through the roofline of the
The plaintiff then brought suit for copyright
building.52
infringement after seeing advertisements, which depicted the
renderings for the defendant’s new residential high-rise
building.53 When analyzing if there was infringement, the court

47
48
49
50
51
52
53

499 U.S. at 344.
Id. at 343.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 362.
527 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1226.
Id. at 1225–26.
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focused on the differences between the two buildings.54 In
particular, the court looked to the differences in the elevator
towers between the two buildings.55 The plaintiff’s elevator
towers were free standing and were located within the
“alternating concave and convex sections” of the building,56 while
the defendant’s elevator towers were located completely within
The plaintiff’s elevator towers were also
the structure.57
cylindrical and grouped in the center of the building, whereas the
defendant’s elevator towers were oval in shape and spread out
evenly throughout the building.58 Finally, the terraces in the
plaintiff’s design were full wraparound terraces, creating the
appearance of a smooth surface, while the defendant’s building
consisted of individual terraces, which created a jagged look.59
The Eleventh Circuit ultimately concluded that no reasonable
jury could find the two works substantially similar due to the
striking differences between the two.60
The Eleventh Circuit took its analysis of the copyright
protectability of architectural works a step further in its seminal
case, Intervest Construction, Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes,
Inc.61 There, a builder who held the copyright for a floor plan of a
four-bedroom house brought a copyright infringement action
against a competing builder.62 Both floor plans were for a four
bedroom house that covered approximately the same square
footage and contained a two-car garage, living room, dining room,
family room, foyer, master bathroom, kitchen, second bathroom,
nook, and porch.63 The placement of “entrances, exits, hallways,
openings, and utilities” was also the same in both plans.64
When conducting its infringement analysis, the court found
that “the definition of an architectural work closely parallels that
of a ‘compilation’ under the statute,” because architectural works
are the “arrangement and coordination of . . . common elements,”

54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

See id. at 1227.
Id. at 1226.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1227.
Id.
Id. at 1226.
554 F.3d 914 (11th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 916–17.
Id. at 916.
Id.
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such as doors, windows, and walls.65 As a result, the Eleventh
Circuit found that architectural works should be considered
compiled works, which, under Feist, receive only thin copyright
protection.66 The court went on to note that, at the summary
judgment stage, a judge is “better able to separate original
expression from the nonoriginal elements of a work,” than the
jury.67
The court found numerous subtle differences between the
two designs.68 For example, the court noticed that the doors to
one of the bedrooms opened in opposite directions.69 The court
also noticed that a closet within the bedroom of the plaintiff’s
house ran the length of the wall, while the closet in the
defendant’s design was “deeper, smaller, and occupie[d] only a
corner of the bedroom.”70 Finally, the defendant’s home design
contained a “bonus room” above the garage, while the plaintiff’s
design did not have any such room.71 The court concluded that,
since the plaintiff’s work should only be afforded thin protection,
summary judgment should be granted in favor of the defendant
due to the differences between the two works.72
Similarly, in Miller’s Ale House, Inc. v. Boynton Carolina Ale
House, LLC, a restaurant operator sued for copyright
infringement against a competing restaurant regarding the
establishment’s interior layout.73 The plaintiff argued that the
defendant copied their restaurant floor plan because defendant’s
“rectangular bar at the center of the restaurant, booth seating,”
high-top tables, kitchen and freezer area, and restrooms were all
arranged in the same way as their own floor plan.74 Following
the precedent set in both Oravec and Intervest, the Eleventh
Circuit upheld summary judgment in favor of the defendant,
stating that “modest dissimilarities are more significant than
they may be in other types of art works.”75 The court noted that

65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Id. at 919.
Id.
Id. at 920.
Id. at 916–18.
Id. at 917.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 921.
702 F.3d 1312, 1324 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1326.
Id. (quoting Howard v. Sterchi, 974 F.2d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 1992)).
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the arrangement of the pool tables and video games within each
restaurant was different, and that the defendant’s restaurant
had outside seating, while plaintiff’s restaurant did not.76 In
addition to focusing its analysis on the difference between the
two works, the court acknowledged that the thin protection
afforded to architectural works was insufficient to support the
plaintiff’s infringement claim.77
Applying the test established in Intervest, the district court
in Jeff Benton Homes v. Alabama Heritage Homes, Inc. also
upheld summary judgment in favor of the defendant on a
copyright infringement claim.78
The plaintiff constructed
residential homes and held the copyright on two home designs.79
Plaintiff sued the defendant, a competing homebuilder, for
infringement based on the defendant’s home design.80 The court
acknowledged that there were “undeniable similarities” between
the two designs, explaining that the plans “share the same basic
configuration of entrance foyer, living room, dining room, family
room, and kitchen.”81 Additionally, the court found that the
master bath in both the defendant’s and plaintiff’s designs
contained “a double vanity, garden tub, separate shower, and
separate water closet, and each master suite contain[ed] either
one larger or two smaller walk-in closets.”82 Nevertheless, the
court concluded that the differences between the two designs
were “of the same scale as the differences between the [plaintiff’s]
and [defendant’s] plans discussed in the . . . Intervest decision.”83
In particular, the court looked to: (1) the differences in “the
layout of the master suite”; (2) the differences in interior door
and ceiling designs; (3) the “differences in window placement[;]
[(4)] [the] presence of a walk-in pantry in only the [defendant’s
design]”; (5) the absence of a hallway leading to the master suite
in the plaintiff’s design; (6) the differences in interior wall angles;
and (7) the different entry points to the guest bathroom.84 As a
result, the court reached the same conclusion as the court in
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Id. at 1327.
Id.
929 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1255 (N.D. Ala. 2013).
Id. at 1245, 1247.
Id. at 1246.
Id. at 1253.
Id.
Id. at 1254.
Id.
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Intervest.85 The court upheld summary judgment in favor of the
defendant because the differences between the works precluded
an infringement claim.86
B.

The Second Circuit’s Traditional Approach

The Second Circuit, on the other hand, has adopted a
different methodology with regard to the copyright protectability
of architectural works. In Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v.
Simone Development Corp.,87 the court was tasked with
determining the proper method for examining copyright
infringement of an architectural design. It concluded that the
overall expression of the two works, rather than the differences
between the two works, should be the driving force when
determining if there is infringement.88 There, the plaintiff and
defendant agreed to submit a joint proposal for a complex, which
consisted of a residential high-rise tower, retail space at the base
of the tower, a new pedestrian plaza, a public park, and an
aboveground parking garage.89
The plaintiff subsequently
registered his designs with the United States Copyright Office.90
A dispute between the parties eventually led to a termination of
their relationship, and the defendants later hired a different firm
to proceed with the project.91 The plaintiff then brought suit,
stating that the defendants unlawfully used the plaintiff’s
copyrighted designs.92
When determining whether there was infringement, the
court refused to accept that it was “required to dissect [the
works] into their separate components, and compare only those
elements which are in themselves copyrightable.”93 The court
instead focused on “comparing the contested design’s ‘total
concept and overall feel’ with that of the allegedly infringed
work.”94 Focusing on the work as a whole rather than just keying
in on the differences is essential because “the defendant may
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Id.
Id.
602 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 66.
Id. at 60.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 66 (alteration in original).
Id. (citations omitted).
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infringe on the plaintiff’s work not only through literal copying of
a portion of it, but also by parroting properties that are apparent
only when numerous aesthetic decisions embodied in the
plaintiff’s work of art . . . are considered in relation to one
another.”95
The court ultimately affirmed the grant of
defendant’s motion to dismiss because “no more was taken than
ideas and concepts.”96 This is due to the fact that the features
which the defendant allegedly misappropriated were merely
“common to countless other urban high-rise residential
developments.”97
In its seminal case, the Second Circuit, in Zalewski v. Cicero
Builder Development, Inc., declined to find that architectural
works should only receive thin protection, and expanded upon
the idea set forth in Gaito, that the overall work must be
examined when determining infringement.98 There, a selfemployed architect granted licenses to the defendants to use
several of plaintiff’s designs.99 After the licenses had expired, the
defendants continued to use and customize plaintiff’s designs.100
The plaintiff brought suit against the defendants for copyright
infringement, and the district court granted the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment.101
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s
theory that architectural works should be considered
compilations.102 The court pointed to the fact that “architectural
works and compilations are not the only works that are defined
with reference to their discrete—and perhaps uncopyrightable—
elements.”103 It went on to note that classifying architectural
95

Id.
Id. at 68.
97
Id.
98
754 F.3d 95, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2014).
99
Id. at 98.
100
Id. at 98–99.
101
Id. at 99. The District Court found that “the overwhelming majority of the
similarities can be attributed to the fact that both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ works
are heavily influenced by, and incorporate hallmark features of, Colonial
architecture.” Zalewski v. T.P. Builders, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 135, 153 (N.D.N.Y.
2012) aff'd sub nom. Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95 (2d Cir.
2014).
102
Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 104.
103
Id. Despite the fact that literary works such as books and periodicals are
made up of individual words and numbers, none of which are copyrightable on their
own, the resulting product still receives full copyright protection. Id.; see Softel, Inc.
v. Dragon Med. & Sci. Commc'ns, Inc., 118 F.3d 955, 964 (2d Cir. 1997).
96
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works as compilations “obscures the real issue.”104 Every work of
art is made up of uncopyrightable elements to some degree; the
issue that must be addressed when handling a copyright
infringement claim is what aspects of the work “originated with
the author.”105 The court ultimately concluded that copyrights for
architectural works should be treated the same as copyrights in
other works, pointing to legislative history to support its
assertion.106 When handling unique areas of creative expression,
such as architecture, the court should merely apply the “usual
copyright doctrines of merger, public domain, and scènes-à-faire
to these new circumstances.”107
Despite disagreeing with the Eleventh Circuit’s approach,
the court still affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of
the defendant.108
Although the plaintiff did add his own
expression to the work, only “very close copying” would have
infringed on the plaintiff’s design because plaintiff’s original
contribution to the pre-existing colonial style was only slight.109
The defendant only copied the generalities that are found in a
colonial style home and did not use any of the plaintiff’s original
expression.110
While both designs included the “hallmark
features of[] Colonial architecture,” the court found significant
differences between the dimensions and shapes of the rooms, the
overall square footage of the homes, the window and door
placement, the pitch and size of the roofs, and the layout of the
rooms when comparing the two designs.111
The decision leaves other circuits with the question of
whether or not one will actually reach a different result if the
Second Circuit’s approach is applied rather than the test set out
by the Eleventh Circuit. While it appears from subsequent
decisions coming out of the Eleventh Circuit that the Intervest
standard has the propensity to dispose of an infringement claim

104

Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 104.
Id.; see Rolwes Co. v. Barnes, No. 4:14CV1045, 2014 WL 3701039, at *3 (E.D.
Mo. July 25, 2014) amended by No. 4:14CV1045, 2014 WL 4966071 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 2,
2014).
106
Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 104.
107
Id. at 105.
108
Id. at 107.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Zalewski v. T.P. Builders, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 135, 153 (N.D.N.Y. 2012)
aff'd sub nom. Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2014).
105
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before it reaches trial,112 it remains to be seen whether the
Second Circuit’s approach will lead to the same result. While in
theory it would appear as though the Second Circuit’s approach
could lead to more cases being decided by jury, the evolution of
copyright law as a whole may prevent such an outcome. This
concern will be discussed in detail in the following section.
The first court to follow the Second Circuit’s approach was
the United States District Court of Missouri, Eastern Division.113
In Rolwes Co. v. Barnes, the plaintiff, a homebuilder, held the
copyright for his “Rockport design” of a single family home.114 He
subsequently brought suit for copyright infringement after the
defendant began construction of ten homes.115 Evidence was
submitted that the defendants photocopied the plaintiff’s designs
when applying for permits.116 The plaintiff also submitted
evidence that the defendant submitted the plans in a redrawn
handwritten form with the plaintiff’s name removed when
applying for other permits.117
Applying the approach set forth in Zalewski, the court
recognized that it must “determine what aspects of Plaintiff’s
Rockport design, if any, are copyrightable, and whether [the
d]efendants’ designs feature substantially similar features.”118
The court initially rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the
placement of the stairs for the basement and the open kitchen
entry were unique to the Rockport design.119 The hallmark of the
plaintiff’s Rockport design is that it contains two ancillary
bedrooms in the front of the house, and a master bedroom in the
rear of the house.120 The ancillary bedrooms are not connected
with the master bedroom via hallway and the master bedroom is

112

See Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 914,
920 (11th Cir. 2008); Miller's Ale House, Inc. v. Boynton Carolina Ale House, LLC,
702 F.3d 1312, 1324 (11th Cir. 2012); Jeff Benton Homes v. Ala. Heritage Homes
Inc., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1255 (N.D. Ala. 2013); Sieger Suarez Architectural
P’ship, Inc. v. Arquitectonica Int’l Corp., 998 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
113
Rolwes Co. v. Barnes, No. 4:14CV1045, 2014 WL 3701039, at *3 (E.D. Mo.
July 25, 2014) amended by No. 4:14CV1045, 2014 WL 4966071 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 2,
2014).
114
Id. at *1.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id. at *3.
119
Id.
120
Id. at *2.
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accessed from a separate entryway in the great room of the
house.121 The court, nevertheless, found that the defendant
copied the “unique and copyrightable aspects” of the plaintiff’s
design, after applying traditional copyright doctrines.122 The
court noted that having the ancillary bedrooms in the front of the
house, which are not connected to the master bedroom via
hallway, and having access to the master bedroom through the
great room at the rear of the house were unique expressions
created by the plaintiff, which should be protected.123 As a result,
the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction was granted
“[b]ecause both parties [were] in agreement that the location of
the bedrooms, which are serviced by two separate hallways, in
1700 square foot house is unique to the Rockport design.”124
III. ANALYSIS OF THE COMPETING APPROACHES
This Note argues that, as other circuits come across the
same issue and are faced with a choice of what standard they
should apply, they should adopt the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit’s approach to the copyright
protectability of architectural works. The rationale behind the
Second Circuit’s approach is expressly rooted in Title 17 and
supported by legislative history.125 Additionally, the Eleventh
Circuit’s belief that architectural works should only receive thin
protection runs the risk of infringing upon the constitutional
rights of architects. The approach makes the judge the fact
finder, potentially depriving the plaintiff of their right to a jury
trial.126 Finally, courts should avoid the Eleventh Circuit’s
approach because of the resultant public policy implications.
Thin protection creates an insufficient incentive for architects
because it may encourage them to become hesitant to invest
significant time and money into their work.127 Ultimately, the
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Id.
Id. at *4.
123
Id.
124
Id. at *3.
125
Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2014); see
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 1 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6935.
126
Milbrath, supra note 9, at 51.
127
Id. at 50–51.
122
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United States Supreme Court or Congress must set the record
straight and clarify the copyright protectability of architectural
works.
A.

Statutory Support

Both Circuits claim support for their respective approaches
within the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990.
Meant to put the United States in compliance with the Berne
Convention,128 the Act specifically defines “architectural work” as
a term completely separate from a “compilation” or “collective
work.”129
Despite this distinction, the Eleventh Circuit in
Intervest argued that “the definition of architectural work[s]
closely parallels that of a ‘compilation’ ” and therefore both
should receive the same level of protection.130 The Eleventh
Circuit keyed in on the description of a compilation, which are
works “formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in
such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an
original work of authorship,” and argued that architectural
works are formed in a largely similar manner.131 The Second
Circuit addressed this argument by pointing directly to the
statute.132 While both “architectural works” and “compilations”
can be defined as “arrangement[s],” and both are made up of
“standard elements,” other fully protected works are also defined
while referencing their uncopyrightable elements.133 Title 17
defines “motion pictures” as a “series of related images,” and
“literary works” as works “expressed in words, numbers or other
verbal or numerical symbols or indicia.”134 Images, words, and
numbers are all standard uncopyrightable elements, yet motion
pictures and literary works enjoy full protection under copyright
law.135 Therefore, the argument that architectural works should,

128

MERGES ET AL., supra note 14, at 500.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
130
Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 914, 919
(11th Cir. 2008).
131
Id.
132
Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 104 (2d Cir. 2014).
133
Id.; see § 101.
134
§ 101.
135
Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 103−04.
129
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like compilations, receive only thin protection due to the
similarities between the two definitions seems to fail when
examining the definitions of other works under Title 17.
It is worth noting that 17 U.S.C. § 120 makes certain
qualifications to the protection of architectural works.136 Title 17
states that the copyright protection of an architectural work is
not meant to prevent others from making pictures, paintings, or
photographs of an ordinarily visible building.137 The statute also
authorizes alterations or destruction of the building without the
need for the copyright owner’s consent.138
B.

Legislative History

The Second Circuit’s approach also finds support from
legislative history. The court in Zalewski looked specifically to
House Report 101-735,139 where the Committee of the Judiciary
provided commentary regarding the 1990 amendment of Title 17
relating to architectural works.140
While examining the
characteristics of architecture, the committee drew comparisons
to poetry.141 The committee looked to a quote by Ada Louise
Huxtable,142 who stated, “architects can make ‘poetry out of
visual devices, as a writer uses literary or aural devices. As
words become symbols, so do objects; the architectural world is
an endless source of symbols with unique ramifications in time
and space.’ ”143 The Committee went on to cite Frank Lloyd

136

17 U.S.C. § 120 (2012).
Id.
138
Id.
139
754 F.3d at 104.
140
H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 11–14 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935,
6942–45.
141
Id. at 6943−44.
142
Ada Louise Huxtable was known as the first full-time architecture critic.
David W. Dunlap, Ada Louise Huxtable, Champion of Livable Architecture, Dies at
91, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/08/arts/design/adalouise-huxtable-architecture-critic-dies-at-91.html. Huxtable was a Pulitzer Prize
winning journalist for The New York Times, known specifically for her commentaries
on architecture. Id. Her work drew mainly upon the social aspects of architecture
and how the structures represent “the collective spirit that we call society.” Id.
143
H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 12–13, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6943–44.
The Committee stressed the importance of architecture in people’s daily lives, “not
only as a form of shelter or as an investment, but also as a work of art.” Id. at 6943.
It is an art form that “performs a very public, social purpose.” Id. They went on to
recognize that “[b]uildings will always remain the most valuable aspect in a people's
environment, the one most capable of cultural reaction.” Id. The Committee then
137
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Wright, who declared, “the design of a work of architecture is a
‘writing’ under the Constitution and fully deserves protection
under the Copyright Act.”144 Finally, the Committee noted that
architectural works “stimulate excellence in design, thereby
enriching our public environment in keeping with the
constitutional goal.”145
The Committee’s examination of the issue of whether there
should be limitations on injunctive relief regarding infringement
of architectural works furthers the conclusion that architectural
works should receive full protection under copyright law.146
When contemplating if there should be limitations on injunctive
relief, the Committee weighed both the possibility that an
infringing structure could cause “irreparable injury to the
copyright owner” and the strong public policy in favor of not
destroying useful buildings.147 It was ultimately concluded that
injunctive relief for infringement of architectural works should be
governed by “general principles applicable to all categories of
subject matter,” and the complexities of granting the injunction
will be determined on a case-by-case basis.148
Finally, the Committee concluded that “general standards of
originality” should apply for architectural works, and that
determinations of infringement of architectural works should “be
made according to the same standard applicable to all other
forms of protected subject matter.”149 The Committee went on to
state that the language of the definition of architectural works,
such as the nonprotectibility of “individual standard features”
does not indicate that a “higher standard of similarity is required
to prove infringement,” or that protection is “limited to verbatim
or near-verbatim copying.”150 Instead, the conclusion of the
House Committee seems to indicate that copyrights for
architectural works should be held to the same standard as other
copyrights.

provided the Capitol building as an example, explaining that it “serves as a strong
symbol of our country's dedication to democracy.” Id.
144
Id. at 6944.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 6945.
149
Id. at 6952.
150
Id.
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The House Committee also explained the limitations on
protection for architectural works set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 120.151
With regard to subsection 120(a), which prevents copyright law
for architectural works from extending to pictorial
representations of the structure, the Committee explained that
architectural works are a “public art form” and should be
“enjoyed as such.”152 The photography of architecture is used not
only to memorialize one’s trip to a city, but also as a teaching
mechanism in numerous scholarly books on architecture.153
Permitting photography of architectural works does “not
interfere with the normal exploitation of [such] works.”154 The
subsection was meant not only to comply with the Berne
Convention, but also to “provide an exemption, rather than rely
on the doctrine of fair use” when dealing with a claim for
infringement regarding a photograph.155 Subsection (b), which
authorizes the destruction or alteration of the work without the
architect’s consent, was meant by the legislature to expressly
state that subsection 109(a)—which permits an owner of a
phonorecord to “sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that
copy of phonorecord”—is meant to apply to architectural works.156
The House Report makes it clear that the intentions of the
Committee are embodied in the Second Circuit’s approach.
Rather than grant architectural works only thin protection, the
Second Circuit recognized the legislature’s intention that there
should not be a higher standard of similarity between the works
to prove infringement.157 As a result, the court in Zalewski
concluded that the “usual copyright doctrines,” such as the
doctrine of merger, public domain, scènes-à-faire, and the ideaexpression dichotomy, should apply when examining copyright
infringement of architectural works.158 Applying thin protection
would essentially protect architectural works only from verbatim
copying, which goes beyond the intentions of the legislature.159

151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159

Id. at 6953.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6953−54.
Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 104 (2d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 105.
H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 21, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6952.
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Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit’s focus on the
dissimilarities between the original work and the work in
question cuts directly against the legislative intent, which
suggests that the overall design should be taken into account
when evaluating the scope of protection. The House Committee
suggested a two-part test for determining such scope.160 The first
step requires one to “determine whether there are original design
elements present, including overall shape and interior
architecture.”161 If there are in fact original design elements, one
must determine if the elements are functionally required.162 If
not, then the work is protectable.163 The Committee went on to
state that the “aesthetically pleasing overall shape of an
architectural work could be protected.”164 Rather than examining
the overall design or similarities between both the original work
and the work in question, the Eleventh Circuit has chosen to
focus primarily on the differences between the works.165 By
comparing only the differences between two works, the Eleventh
Circuit’s approach has the potential to lose sight of the overall
shape of the original work—a factor that the legislature
suggested should be taken into account and protected.166
Scholars have further concluded that, because courts have

160

Id. at 6951−52.
Id. at 6951.
162
Id. at 6951−52.
163
Id. at 6952.
164
Id.
165
See Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 914,
921 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that dissimilarities between the two floor plans were
sufficient to conclude that “no reasonable, properly instructed jury could find the
works substantially similar”); Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527
F.3d 1218, 1226, 1228 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that the “numerous significant
differences” between the partially exposed elevator towers and the use of concave
and convex sections was enough to conclude that the works were substantially
similar); Miller's Ale House, Inc. v. Boynton Carolina Ale House, LLC, 702 F.3d
1312, 1324 (11th Cir. 2012); Howard v. Sterchi, 974 F.2d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 1992).
Scholars have found the Eleventh Circuit’s focus on the differences rather than the
similarities “unorthodox.” Milbrath, supra note 9, at 51.
166
Courts have found that specifically focusing on dissimilarities is an improper
approach when determining infringement. See Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d
898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that “[d]issection of dissimilarities is inappropriate
because it distracts a reasonable observer from a comparison of the total concept and
feel of the works”); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir.
1936) (finding that “no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his
work he did not pirate”); Steven T. Lowe, Death of Copyright, 33-NOV L.A. L. 32, 34
(2010).
161
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applied only thin protection to architectural works, the
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act has not had a
significant “impact on stimulating excellence in design in the
United States,” like Congress intended.167
The Second Circuit’s approach, on the other hand, takes into
account both the similarities and differences between the works,
in accordance with the legislative history. In Zalewski, the court
examined the “overall footprint” of the structure and found that
the similarities between the two works stemmed only from the
“generalities of the style.”168
Rather than base judgment
primarily upon the differences between works, the Second
Circuit’s approach more adequately follows the intent of the
legislature by examining the overall similarities between the
works.169
C.

Public Policy Considerations

1.

Eleventh Circuit Approach Contrary to Public Policy

Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit’s approach seems
troublesome on public policy grounds. Article I, Section 8, Clause
8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the
[p]rogress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
[t]imes to [a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their
respective [w]ritings and [d]iscoveries.”170 The Supreme Court
has stated that the purpose of granting an author a monopoly
over her original expression “lie[s] in the general benefits derived
by the public from the labors of authors.”171 The monopoly over
the expression “serves to induce release to the public of the
products of his creative genius.”172
The issue still remains over how much protection original
expression should be afforded. Granting broad protection to
works may actually inhibit the progress of science rather than
167
David E. Shipley, The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act at
Twenty: Has Full Protection Made A Difference?, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 59 (2010).
168
Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2014).
169
Id.; see H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 21 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6935, 6952.
170
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
171
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); see Morton
Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942); see also U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8.
172
Paramount Pictures, 344 U.S. at 158.
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promote it because a broad grant has the potential to diminish
the “store of ideas” on which others should be free to build.173 On
the other hand, if copyright protection proves to be too narrow,
then it has the potential to erode an author’s incentive to create
and develop innovative works because the possibility of personal
gain is greatly diminished.174
By applying thin protection to architectural works, the
Eleventh Circuit runs the risk of creating an insufficient
incentive for architects to design and create original structures.
Since architectural works would only be protected from
essentially verbatim copying under the Eleventh Circuit’s
approach, potential infringers can create structures that are
substantially similar to the original work, yet suffer no
consequences. As a result, these potential infringers can avoid
the costly process of designing an original structure by merely
constructing a structure that is substantially similar to an
original work that is already in existence. Architects will
therefore be less likely to create an original expression, since
substantially similar structures can be created without
consequence.
2.

Second Circuit Approach Advances Public Policy

On the other hand, one may argue that the Second Circuit’s
approach provides architects with overbroad protection of their
works, preventing, rather than promoting, the advancement of
art and science. The argument fails because the Second Circuit
took such considerations into account when developing its
standard. The court in Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc.
recognized that “[a]rchitects cannot claim that good engineering
is original to them—or at least can get no copyright protection for
it.”175 Additionally, the Second Circuit’s approach determines
copyright protectability on a case-by-case basis.176 Applying the
173
Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1225 (11th Cir.
2008); see Milbrath, supra note 9, at 51.
174
See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 2013); Milbrath, supra note
9, at 50–51; Anthony R. Enriquez, The Destructive Impulse of Fair Use After Cariou
v. Prince, 24 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 27 (2013).
175
754 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2014); see Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v.
Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
176
Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 104–05; see Rolwes Co. v. Barnes, No. 4:14CV1045,
2014 WL 3701039, at *3 (E.D. Mo. July 25, 2014) amended by No. 4:14CV1045, 2014
WL 4966071 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2014).
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idea-expression dichotomy similarly prevents against overbroad
protection of an architect’s work.177 The dichotomy ensures that
only the architect’s original expression is protected, not the
generalized ideas and concepts surrounding the expression.178
The court’s application of the usual copyright doctrines of
merger, public domain, and scènes-à-faire will also serve to
ensure that only an architect’s original expression will be
protected.179 Thus, adequate safeguards have been put in place
by the Second Circuit to prevent protection of architectural works
from extending too broadly and inhibiting the progression of art
and science.
D. Constitutional Concerns
1.

Potential Infringement of Seventh Amendment Rights

The Eleventh Circuit’s approach also has the potential to
curtail a copyright holder’s constitutional rights. The Seventh
Amendment of the Constitution explicitly grants one the right to
a trial by jury.180 When handling copyright infringement issues,
courts are in agreement that the issue of substantial similarity is
a question of fact, and therefore summary judgment is
traditionally frowned upon.181 Courts view the jury as the proper
decision maker when deciding if there is substantial similarity
due to the “inherently subjective nature of the inquiry.”182
Despite these considerations, in the Eleventh Circuit’s
seminal case, Intervest Construction, Inc. v. Canterbury Estate
Homes, Inc.,183 the judge decided that that the question of
substantial similarity at the level of protectable expression
regarding compilations is a question best answered by a judge at
a summary judgment proceeding.184
The judge essentially
concluded that the question of potential infringement with
regard to architectural works should be considered a question of
177

Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 105.
Id.
179
Id.
180
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
181
Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1232 (11th Cir. 2010); see Jones
v. Blige, 558 F.3d 485, 490 (6th Cir. 2009); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
618 F.2d 972, 978 (2d Cir. 1980).
182
Latimer, 601 F.3d at 1232.
183
554 F.3d 914 (11th Cir. 2008).
184
Id. at 920.
178
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law, citing no relevant authority to support his assertion.185 He
justified his conclusion by explaining that “a judge is better able
to separate original expression from the non-original elements of
a work where the copying of the latter is not protectable and the
copying of the former is protectable.”186 He went on to note that
the idea-expression dichotomy is difficult to apply because there
is no bright-line test, and since the judge better understands the
dichotomy, he is in a better position to make the
determination.187 The test for infringement is “more often
correctly administered by a judge rather than a jury—even one
provided proper instruction.”188
The opinion in Intervest is a profound departure from
traditional copyright theory, which provides that the issue of
substantial similarity is a question of fact for the jury to decide.
The opinion effectively transfers decision-making power from the
jury to the judge.189 If the approach in Intervest is adopted, many
copyright infringement cases, which would normally go to trial
based on fact issues surrounding substantial similarity, would
instead be resolved at the summary judgment level. The
application prevents copyright owners from litigating their
claims before a jury, potentially denying their Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial.
2.

Second Circuit Avoids The Issue

One may argue that the Second Circuit’s approach also has
the potential to infringe on a copyright owner’s Seventh
Amendment rights, as evidenced by the court in Zalewski
upholding summary judgment despite rejecting the Eleventh
Circuit’s approach. This argument fails because, while summary
judgment may still be granted under the Second Circuit’s
approach, it should theoretically occur less often. This is due to
the fact that granting thin protection makes it much easier for a
court to conclude that there are no genuine issues of material
fact. The heightened standard will compel more courts to grant

185

Id.
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id. Scholars have interpreted the opinion as coming “close to adopting a de
novo process for determining the substantial similarity issue.” Milbrath, supra note
9, at 51.
186
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summary judgment than if normal copyright standards are
applied. Since the Second Circuit applies traditional copyright
doctrines rather than thin protection, the threshold to prove
copyright infringement will be less onerous, and therefore
summary judgment will be less appropriate more often.
For example, when a defendant moves for summary
judgment on a copyright infringement claim, if thin protection is
the standard, then the defendant need only prove that no
reasonable jury could determine that the defendant copied the
plaintiff’s work verbatim.190 Therefore, for a fact issue to exist,
there must be enough evidence to establish that there was
potentially verbatim copying. Evidence that the works were
substantially similar will not be sufficient to survive summary
judgment.191 On the other hand, if traditional copyright doctrines
are applied, the defendant not only has to show that there was no
verbatim copying, but also he must show that a jury would not be
able to find the two works to be substantially similar.192 For a
fact issue to exist under traditional copyright law, evidence of
verbatim copying is not required, there must only be evidence
that the two works were substantially similar.193
3.

Constitutional Concerns with Copyright Law Generally

Although the Second Circuit’s approach should, in theory,
better protect an architect’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial, recent developments within copyright law generally may
erode such protection. Preventing one from exercising their
Seventh Amendment right to a jury in a copyright infringement
case is not an issue exclusive to architectural works.194 Courts
have begun to favor deciding all sorts of copyright infringement
cases at the summary judgment level, “removing both experts
and juries from the process entirely.”195 For example, courts have
become “more willing to dismiss expert witnesses to screenplay
copyright infringement claims and analyze the works
themselves.”196 As a result, the judge is acting as a “self-

190
191
192
193
194
195
196

See FED R. CIV. P. 56(a).
See id.
See id.
See id.
Lowe, supra note 166, at 32, 34.
Id. at 36.
Id.
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appointed expert.”197 Thus, the constitutional implications of
court policy favoring summary judgment regarding copyright
infringement stretch far beyond architectural works and should
be remedied immediately.
CONCLUSION
When determining what degree of copyright protection
architectural works should receive, federal courts should adopt
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s
approach, which requires architectural works to be governed by
the same standards as all other copyrights. The Second Circuit’s
approach is directly rooted in both the statutory language as well
as in the legislative history, which suggests that architectural
works should be treated the same as other copyrights. The
Eleventh Circuit’s approach, however, directly contradicts
legislative history by suggesting that architectural works should
only receive thin protection under copyright law because the
definition of architectural works closely resembles the definition
of a compilation. This approach not only cuts against legislative
history, but also has the potential to deny a copyright holder’s
constitutional rights because thin protection increases the
likelihood that a copyright infringement case will be decided at
summary judgment rather than at trial.
Finally, affording architectural works only thin protection
violates public policy, which seeks to encourage the advancement
of art and science. The lack of protection has the ability to create
an insufficient incentive for architects to create original works
because their resulting product would receive little protection
from potential copying. In contrast, the Second Circuit affords
architectural works the same protection as other copyrights,
avoiding Constitutional issues and maintaining the incentives for
architects to continue to construct original structures. At this
time, it is essential that the Supreme Court or Congress resolve
this apparent disagreement between the circuits and determine
the proper degree of protection that architectural works should
be afforded.
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